A structural model of the demand for college attendance is derived as a selection problem in the theory of comparative advantage, in which individuals are endowed with different kinds of talents. Some talents and abilities are more valuable in the types of work associated with college education and others are more valuable for work associated with high school education. For example, mechanical abilities are less important for lawyers than for plumbers, whereas verbal abilities are much more valuable for lawyers. The market tends to sort people into work activities for which they have a comparative advantage, as indexed by expected earnings in each activity. The structural model also allows for the influence of parental background in the selection process.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we specify and estimate a model of the demand for college education derived from its effect on expected lifetime earnings compared with its cost. Attention is focused on specifying the role of earnings expeetations in the derived demand for schooling, which are found to be important determinants of the decision to attend college. In addition to including financial incentives, the model allows for a host of selectivity or sorting effects in the data that are related to "ability bias," family effects and tastes that have occupied other researchers. Background and motivation are presented in Section II. The structure of the model is a variant of a simultaneous equations problem involving discrete choices and is derived in Section III. The estimates, based on data from the NBER-Thorndike sample, appear in Section IV. Some implications and conclusions are found in Section V.
II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Estimates of rates of return to education have been controversial because they are based on ex post realizations and need not reflect structural parameters necessary for correct predictions. For example, it is well understood that college and high school graduates may have different abilities so that income foregone during college by the former is not necessarily equal to observed earnings of the latter. Our objective here is two-fold: One is to estimate life earnings conditioned on actual school choices that are purged of selection bias. The other is to determine the extent to which alternative earnings prospects as distinct from family background and financial constraints influence the decision to attend college.
One need go no further than straightforward comparisons of earnings outcomes among school classes for structural rate of return estimates if educational wage differentials were everywhere equalizing on the direct, opportunity and interest costs of schooling. For then the supplies of graduates (or "demands" for each level of education) would be nearly elastic at the equalizing wage differentials and the distribution of human wealth would be approximately independent of the distribution of schooling.
l However, recent evidence on the structure of life earnings based on panel data strongly rejects this as a serious possibility. Total variance of earnings among people of the same sex, race, education and market experience is very large, and more than two-thirds of it is attributable to unobserved components or person-specific effects that probably persist over much of the life cycle. 2 The panel evidence therefore suggests that supply elasticities are substantially less than completely elastic at unique wage differentials, and that there are inframarginal "ability rents." Put in another way, observed rates of return are not wholly supply determined and depend on interactions with relative demands for graduates as well.
A natural approach has been to incorporate measures of ability into the statistical analysis, either directly or as indicators of unobserved factors, in order to, in effect, impute ability rent. But merely partitioning observed earnings into schooling and ability components does not use any of the restrictions imposed on the data by a school stopping rule and that decision embodies all the economic content of the problem. Some of that additional structure is incorporated here. There are many estimates of recursive models in the literature, but very few have tested the economic (wealth maximizing)
hypothesis. 4
We begin with the assumption of marked heterogeneity and diversity in the population implicit in the unobserved component approach to panel data mentioned above. Costs and benefits of alternative school completion levels are assumed to be randomly distributed among people according to their capacities to finance education, tastes, perceptions, expectations, and an array of tal- have very limited potential as highly schooled lawyers, but by the same token lawyers may have much lower potential as plumbers than those who actually end up choosing that kind of work. This contrasts markedly with the one factor ability-as-IQ specifications in the literature which assume that the best lawyers would also be the best plumbers and would imply strictly hierarchical sorting in the absence of financial constraints. In effect an IQ-ability model constrains the unobserved ability components to have large positive covariances--an assumption that is probably erroneous and not necessary for our methods. Note also that population mean "rates of return" among alternative schooling levels have no significance as guides to the social or private profitability of investments in schooling. For example, a random member of the population might achieve a negative return from an engineering degree;
yet those with appropriate talents who choose engineering will obtain a return on the time and money costs of their training which is at least equal to the rate of interest. 6 There are difficult estimation problems associated with selectivity models.
In brief, the unobservables impose distinct limits on the amount of structural information that can be inferred from realized assignments in the data. For example, it would be very desirable to know the marginal distribution of talents in (2.4), since it would then be possible to construct the socially efficient assignment of individuals to school classes, defined as the one that maximizes overall human wealth. Then the dead weight losses due to capital market imperfections could be computed by comparing optimal with observed assignments. However, the marginal density is not itself identified, since both unobserved financial constraints and talent jointly determine observed outcomes. These issues will be made precise shortly, but roughly speaking we do not necessarily know if a person chose college education because he had talent for it or because he was wealthy. What can and will be done is to map out the joint effects of the unobservables embedded in the actual demand curve for college attendance, which embodies all constraints inherent in the actual market, but which nevertheless is a valid structural basis for prediction.
Selectivity or "ability bias" in unadjusted rate of return computations that do not take account of the sorting by talent inherent in observed assignments can also be computed.
A few limitations to these methods must be noted at\the outset. It is crucial to the spirit of the model, based as it is on human diversity, that few covariance restrictions be placed on the distribution of unobservables. \ This practically mandates the assumption of joint normality, since no other non-independent multivariate distribution offers anything close to similar computational advantages. While the general selection rule specified below is likely to emerge from a broad class of economic models of school choice, it is not known how sensitive the results are to the normality' assumptions.
In addition, nonindependence forces some aggregation in the number of choices The variables on the left hand sides of (3.8) and (3.9) are to be interpreted as the individual's expectation of initial earnings and growth rates at the time the choice is made. In order to obtain consistent estimates of (Sa' Y a ' Sb' Y b ) from data on realizations it is assumed that expectations were unbiased. Hence forecast errors are assumed to be independently normally distributed with zero means.
(3.10)
where Us is a permanent unobserved component influencing financial barriers to school choice. The vector (u.) is assumed to be jointly normal with zero ) means and variance-covarience matrix L = {cr. ,l. L is unrestricted.
Reduced Form. where 6 and yare estimated by the method above. 
Similar expressions hold for covariances between nil and n i2 and between n i3 and n i4
• Hence it is possible to estimate the own population variances o .. JJ for j = 1, ••• ,4, two within group covariances, and four covariances 0.
for J£ j = l , ... ,4. These along with the estimate of 0 provide only 11 statistics £ to estimate 15 parameters. Evidently all the covariance terms in E cannot be estimated without additional zero or other restrictions because we never observe the path not taken. This is the basis for the statement above that dead weight losses from assignments based jointly on wealth and talent rather than on talent alone cannot be imputed. The demand function for college attendance implicit in (3.22) reflects the joint density of talent, wealth, tastes, and expectations and their separate effects cannot be disentangled.
IV. ESTIMATION
The model has been estimated on a sample of 3611 respondents to the NBER-Thorndike-Hagen survey of 1968-71.
16 These data refer to male WWII veterans who applied for the Army Air Corps. They do not come from a random sample of the population since the military screening criteria were based on certain aspects of ability and physical fitness. Therefore it is not possible to extrapolate these results to the population at large.
However, the sample's advantages more than compensate for this. The sample actually used is a subset of 5085 total respondents. Fortytwo observations were dropped for not responding to the age question, another 480 persons were deleted because they were pilots, had extended military service, or did not report a job in 1969, and 952 were dropped because they did not report both initial (y) and latest (y(t» earnings required for structural estimation. Definitions of variables are given in Table I. Individuals were put into two categories: Group A represents those who entered college and Group B, those who stopped school after high school graduation. Not all members of Group A completed college and a substantial fraction completed more than a college education. They are labeled college attendees hereafter.
Descriptive statistics also appear in Table I . Notice that more than 75% of the sample chose to attend college for some period, reflecting the unusual ability distribution in the sample and eligibility. for a liberal college subsidy (the G.I. Bill). However, the presence of the G.I. Bill is common to both college attendees and high school graduates.
There are some obvious differences between the two groups. Both mean and relative variance of earnings in both years is smaller for high school graduates, as tends to be true in other samples. In addition, high school graduates had smaller earnings growth over the period, had more siblings and were lower in birth order than college attendees, and were more likely to have taken vocational training in high school. Their fathers had less schooling and were more likely to be blue-collar workers as well. Four ability measures have been chosen for analysis, out of some 16 indicators available in the data.
Math and reading scores are related to IQ-type of ability (in fact it is known that math score is highly correlated with IQ score in these data), while the other two are more associated with manual skills. The four together seem well suited to the comparative advantage logic underlying the formulation of the model. High school graduates tend to score lower in the math and reading comprehension tests, about the same in manual dexterity and somewhat better on mechanical ability. In line with the previous discussion all ability measures in Table I are assigned to X, while the family background measures--reflecting financial constraints, tastes and perceptions--are assigned to Z. Experience, school completion dummies (for Group A) and year of reported earnings are used exclusively as controls in structural earnings equations.
The first columns in Table II present estimated coefficients and asymptotic t-statistics of the reduced form probit selection into Group A--equation
(3.12). These effects more or less parallel the summary of Table I given above.
Math score has a particularly strong positive effect and mechanical score a strong negative effect on the college attendance decision. The effect of mother I S working is somewhat unexpected. Mother I s home time when the respondent was five years old or younger has virtually no effect on college attendance, whereas the respondent was more likely to go to college if his mother worked when he was 6-14 years of age. This is more supportive of market investment through relaxation of financial constraints rather than of home investments in The problem is more difficult in the case of school completion differences among members of Group A in Table III , and in truth raises an unresolvable aggregation problem. The anticipations argument above suggests that school completion differences within Group A may not enter the earnings equations, so that included variables pick up average completion experience in the sample. Alternatively it can be argued that the level of schooling achieved within Group A should be controlled by including school completion dummies. This latter specification is reported in Table III and is the one used to estimate the structural probit in Table II . Of course we do not switch on the school completion dummies to estimate the earnings advantages of college attendance, since that would clearly stack the deck in favor of finding strong financial effects. Earnings and structural probit equations were also estimated with school dummies deleted and the results were very similar to those reported here. However, it is clear that this issue only can be resolved by going into a more disaggregated model with multiple classifications.
with the exception of experience, most of the variables have little effect on initial earnings in either A or B (See columns 1 and 2 of Table   III ).19 Experience effects are the strongest and are known to be most important at early and late stages of career patterns, fact borne out in these data since experience has little effect on later (surveyed around 1969) earnings. The ability measure that has the largest effect on initial earnings is math score for college attendees. Ability indicators are more important for earnings growth (columns 3 and 4) and later earnings (columns 4 and 5). Table II shows extremely close similarity of a 4 0 in all three equations. In sum, the results give direct, internally consistent evidence on the validity of the economic theory of the demand for schooling derived from its (private) investment value. The economic hypothesis is strongly accepted.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The structural probit estimates of Table II Tables III and IV. E E Apply formula (5.2) to the data in Table I to Table I for the y's and the g's and a schooling increment of 4.11 years. It is 11 percent. An adjusted rate is obtained by using the corrected mean values of the g's above and a similar correction applied to the Y's. The resulting estimate of the population mean internal rate of return is 12 percent, which is actually larger, not smaller than the observed mean rate of return.
Predictions
The model pa~ses the test of empirical verification of its structural restrictions. How well does it do in predicting assignments on independent data? The sample used is not a random drawing of the U.S. population and for this reason cannot be extrapolated to the population at large. However, only a subset of the NBER-Thorndike-Hagen sample was used to estimate it and the remaining remnant is more likely to be a suitable group for prediction purposes. The remnant refers to those who did not report initial earnings.
For this reason it may not be a random sample of the relevant population either. And while there is no reason to suppose that the censoring of initial earnings was systematically related to the selection mechanism of the model, it should be noted that a somewhat smaller proportion of these individuals (66% of them) chose to attend college than in the sample used for structural estimation.
One indirect test of the model's predictive content has been calculated.
First, the reduced form probit was re-estimated for the remnant, which does not involve extrapolations, since the sample selection between A and Band the content of W = [X,Z] is known for these people. Results appear in Table AI . While there is some conformity with Table II , there are also many differences between reduced form estimates in the two samples. In short, family background coefficients are not too stable.
The second experiment involves an extrapolation. Both initial earnings differences and growth rates were predicted for members of the remnant sample from the structural earnings estimates of Table III and then used to re-estimate the structural probit of this group (No t-statistics are reported for structural probit coefficients because of the large expense of doing so).
The results also appear in Table AI . The sign reversals on family background indicators carryover to these estimates too. Indeed, the coefficients and signs of the Z variables in the structural estimates are very close to those found in the reduced form estimates in Table AI . However, the coefficients on the earnings differences and growth rates for the remnant sample are very close to those estimated for the original sample of Table II .
Enrollment Functions
Perhaps the simplest and most useful summary of the results is obtained from the demand function for college attendance implicit in the structural 1. The equalizing difference model originates with Friedman and Kuznets (1954) . Jacob Mincer (1974) has developed it most completely in recent years.
2. See Lillard and Willis (forthcoming) for additional detail and confirmation of these remarks. Related studies have reached similar conclusions, e.g. Lillard and Weiss (1976) . Of course, it is conceivable but unlikely that educational wage diff~rentials are exactly equalizing for each individual although considerable lifetime income inequality exists among individuals. This possibility is rejected in the empirical findings presented below.
3. The basic model is discussed in Becker (1975) . See Rosen (1977) for an elaboration of this argument, and a survey of the relevant literature. Blaug (1976) also stresses the need for estimating structural demand for schooling relationships, and Griliches (1977) discusses the difficulty of doing so in conventional models. Part of Griliches' discussion is pursued in Griliches, Hall and Hausman (1977) . The model elaborated here is conceptually distinct from that work, though some of the statistical techniques a~e similar. A similar remark applies to the work of Kenney, Lee, Maddala and Trost (1977) .
4. There is aggregate time series evidence that earnings are important determinants of professional school enrollment (See Freeman [1968] and numerous subsequent studies by the same author); but there is virtually no micro evidence even though such data has been most often studied in the human capital and signaling framework.
5. Actually, expository convenience dictates a more restrictive formulation than is necessary. X and Z need not be orthogonal. They may have some elements in common, but identification requires that they not have all elements in common. See below.
6. . Roy (1951) gives a surprisingly modern and rigorous treatment of a selection problem based on the theory of comparative advantage. See Rosen (forthcoming) for extensions and elaboration on this class of problems. Heckman (1976) , Lee (1976) and Maddala (1976) develop the appropriate estimation theory.
7. The problem is that the aggregates are sums of distributions that are themselves truncated and selected. Therefore the distributions underlying the aggregate assignments are not necessarily normal. We are unaware of any systematic analysis of this kind of aggregation problem.
8. Methods such as conditional logit have been designed to handle high dimensioned classifications (MacFadden [1973] ) but require independence and other (homogeneity) restrictions that are not tenable for this problem. Hausman and Wise (1978) have worked out computational methods on general n~rmal assumptions for three choices. Note also that maximum likelihood methods are available, but are extremely expensive 1, ... ,4, in because multiple integrals need be evaluated. Hence we follow the lit-er~ture in using consistent estimators.
9. Wise (1974) , Lazear (1975) , and Zabalza (1977) have used initial earnings and growth of earnings to study life earnings patterns. The distribution of potential earnings and growth is not constrained in our model, thus for example allowing the possibility that y and g are a a
negatively correlated (and similarly for Yb and gb) as in Mincer (1975) .
On this see Hause (1977) .
10. The TiS of Section II are related to (u l , ••. u 4 ) by a set of implicit prices that vary across school classifications, as in Mandelbrot (1960). 12. See Heckman (1976) and Lee (1976) .
13. This method is due to Lee (1976) who used it to study unionization status.
Our model differs somewhat in that there is more than one structural equation in each classification.
14. Heckman (l977) and There is no statistically satisfactory way of resolving this problem.
In any event, we cannot be "agnostic" about specification because both the economic and statistical theory require certain nontestable zero identifying restrictions. The problem is even more complicated in the present context because the theory is based on unobserved talent and financial constraint shifters and must have observable counterparts to be operational. Evidently choice among alternative specifications ultimately must rest on predictive performance outside the sample.
16. These data have been extensively analyzed by other investigators, especially Taubman (1975), who also discovered them. For complete documentation see NBER (1973) .,
17.
Recall that female labor force participation during the war increased.
The normalized category for mother's work classifications is nonresponse.
We do not know how many did not respond because no mother was in the home.
18. A related and thorough discussion of this issue appears in Hanoch (1967) , to which the reader is referred. It has not escaped our attention that current variables such as hours of work and unemployment experience might serve as indicators of an unobserved "taste for leisure" component, Table I ).
22. See Kahn, Manski and Mundel (1976) and Radner and Miller (1970) for logit models of college choice. These models contain more detail in personal and college attributes but do not make any attempt to assess the effects of anticipated earnings in college attendance decisions. See Abowd (1977) for another approach to the selection problem focusing on school quality. Dummy variable: 1 if mother worked full time when respondent was less than 6 years of age. Dummy variable: 1 if mother worked part time when respondent was less than 6 years of age. Dummy variable: 1 if mother did not work when respondent was less than 6 hears of age. Dummy variable: 1 if mother worked full time when respondent was 6-14 years of age. Dummy variable: ·1 if mother worked part time when respondent was 6-14 years of age. Dummy variable: 1 if mother did not work when respondent was 6-14 years of age.
Dummy variable: 1 if respondent majored in vocational courses in high school. 
